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INTRODUCTION

Are the sins of previous generations of energy development, such as
with oil and gas, being visited on the newest forms of energy? That is
the question this Article attempts to address. Specifically, this Article
will focus on the problems created by the severance of the mineral
estate from the surface and the related dominant (mineral)–servient
(surface) estate doctrine (“dominant-servient estate doctrine”).
Hydrofracturing or “fracking” for oil and natural gas has placed the
problems of split estates in the spotlight more than they have been in
generations. People have been shocked to find drill rigs in their backyards, school playgrounds, and parks. They have been even more appalled to learn that the law of mineral severance has evolved over
time to hold that they, as surface owners, have little or no control over
such choices by the holders of the mineral estate. The ensuing out† “[The Lord God] will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers on the children and the children’s children, to the third and fourth
generation.” Exodus 34:7.
‡ Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law. The Author would like
to specially acknowledge my research assistant, Samantha Peaslee, for her extensive
and tireless help with this Article.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V1.I3.3
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rage may ultimately change the current balances in severance law;
fracking moratoriums, bans, and lawsuits have slowed fossil fuel development somewhat. However, the unintended casualty in this fray
may be renewable energy.
Fossil fuel interests are entrenched and well-funded, so state legislators would have difficulty turning back the history of ownership rights
in fossil fuels. However, in the furor against severance, legislators
have found it easier to control unestablished renewable energy resources and to enact bans on their severance. While banning severance of wind may be good for many reasons, it becomes problematic if
wind also is relegated to a servient estate position in relation to fossil
fuel development. This additional handicap will make it more difficult
for these new, fledgling energy sources to gain a toehold and survive
in competitive energy markets.
This Article will first provide some general background about severance and the related doctrine of dominant–servient estates. Next, it
will address oil and gas severance specifically. Third, it will track the
parallels and distinctions between the history of wind severance and
the oil and gas history set out in Section II. Finally, Section IV will
address the problems with the current responses to wind severance.
II. SEVERANCE
The focus of this Article will be a comparison of wind rights against
oil and gas rights. Currently, in most U.S. states, oil and gas rights are
categorized as mineral interests that can be owned separately, or “severed,” from ownership of the surface estate.1 Consequently, we will
1. For examples of state treatment of oil and gas interests, see, e.g., Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.
1935); Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 233 P. 835 (Okla. 1923); Bernstein v. Bush, 177 P.2d
913 (Cal. 1947); Alabama Dept. of Transp. v. Land Energy, Ltd., 886 So.2d 787 (Ala.
2004); Cranston v. Miller, 185 S.W.2d 920 (Ark. 1945); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Magness, 946 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1997); Brooke v. Dellinger, 17 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. 1941);
Brown v. Spillman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895); Patterson v. May, 29 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa
1947); Powell v. Prosser, 753 P.2d 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988); Lindsey v. Wilson, 332
S.W. 2d 641 (Ky. 1960); Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. Ct.
App. 1958); Goss v. C.A.N. Wildlife Trust, Inc., 852 A.2d 996 (Md. 2004); Krench v.
State, 269 N.W. 131 (Mich. 1936); Hughes v. Thornton, 193 N.W. 723 (Minn. 1923);
Sun Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1964); Stokes v. Tutvet, 328 P.2d 1096
(Mont. 1958); Reed v. Williamson, 82 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1957); Toth v. Bieglow, 64
A.2d 62 (N.J. 1949); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985);
Frye v. Arrington, 292 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1982); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d
829 (N.D. 1969); Yaquina Bay Timber & Logging Co. v. Shiny Rock Mining Corp.,
556 P.2d 672 (Or. 1976); Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50 (Pa. 1922); Broadhurst v. Am.
Colloid Co., 177 N.W.2d 261 (S.D. 1970); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enters., Inc.,
645 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Holbrook v. Cont’l Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1955). Louisiana follows the more common model for mineral rights worldwide: the minerals are
owned by the state and severance is not allowed at all. Developers only receive a
servitude or easement to access the minerals. Therefore, minerals in place remain the
real property of the state, and individuals can only gain ownership of them as personal
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start with a discussion of the origin of severance and the resulting legal consequences.
A. Short History of Mineral Severance
In the early days of mining, metals were considered wondrous, divine, and royal.2 One of the original meanings of “royalty” was the
right or prerogative of the sovereign to receive a percentage of the
products or proceeds of mining projects within the realm.3 Because of
this, the precious minerals found on a person’s land always belonged
not to the individual, but to the ruler.4 In many countries around the
world, mineral rights remain the property of the sovereign and may
only be leased, not owned, by those seeking to develop a resource.5
The Greeks were one of the first cultures to encourage private prospecting instead of purely state-based mining.6 The government would
grant leases to citizens to mine their tracts of land, then the lessees
were required to pay a premium and a royalty to Athens in return.7
The lessee then could keep the remainder of the extracted materials.8
While the sovereign still owned the real property of the minerals in
the ground, prospectors were able to acquire a personal property interest in the minerals themselves upon their extraction.9
The concept of granting a private property fee estate in minerals
that is entirely separate from the surface is thought to have originated
in the area that now encompasses modern Germany.10 In this region,
separate mining laws were established independent from the ordinary
laws of property.11 These new laws allowed subsurface estates to be
owned separately from any estate in the soil or land itself.12 The
rationale for this new construct was that the exploitation of “subterranean deposits” was “carried on neither within the same boundaries
property once they have been extracted. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling, 91 So.
207 (La. 1920).
2. K.K. DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral-Wind? The Severed Wind Power
Rights Conundrum, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 69, 77 (2009).
3. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (9th ed. 2009)).
4. Id.
5. Christopher S. Kulander, Common Law Aspects of Shale Oil and Gas Development, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 369 (2013) (citing EUGENE KUNTZ, KUNTZ LAW OF
OIL & GAS, § 2.1, 59 (2012)).
6. John C. Lacy, Going with the Current: The Genesis of the Mineral Laws of the
United States, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10, § 10.01(3)(a) (1995).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 10.02(1).
11. ROSSITER W. RAYMOND, RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS TO MINING, H.R.
DOC. NO. 40-54, at 189 (1869).
12. Id.
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nor by the same persons as agriculture,” so separate and distinct property regimes could exist without conflict.13
In early England, precious metals and some non-precious metals
generally belonged to the crown.14 But aside from these metals, the
fee owner of the land generally also held the mineral rights to that
land.15 When early English cases permitted severance of these rights,
they noted that allowing a separate mineral estate was generally considered an “abrogation” of the common law right of absolute ownership by the surface owner.16
While the idea of “royalties” came to the United States early
through the royal charters of the colonies reserving one-fifth of mined
minerals to the crown,17 the concept of severance and private ownership of minerals in place was purely by accident.18 Gold was discovered near Coloma, California, in January of 1848.19 The military
governor of the area refused to assert any claim to the minerals on
behalf of the United States, instead “declar[ing] the miners free from
official control.”20 This went contrary to official policy, but was not
done for any rebellious purposes—the miners simply outnumbered
government soldiers 1,000 to one.21
In the decades after the California gold rush, the U.S. government
decided it did not have the resources to collect royalties from miners.22 However, the government did hope to reap financial benefits
from selling patents to unsettled western territories that otherwise
seemed unproductive.23 The mechanism established in the 1872 Min13. “[T]he miners dig almost exclusively in mountains otherwise unproductive,
and in valleys invested in gloom, they do either slight damage to the fields or none at
all. Lastly, where woods and glades are cut down, they may be sown with grain after
they have been cleared from the roots of shrubs and trees.” GEORGIUS AGRICOLA,
DE RE METALLICA 71 (1556) (Herbert Clark Hoover and Lou Henry Hoover trans.,
Dover Publications, Inc. N.Y. 1950).
14. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-54, at 206–07.
15. Id. at 207; see also John C. Lacy, The Historic Origins of the U.S. Mining Laws
and Proposals for Change, 10 NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENV’T L. 13, 10–15
(1995) (describing how the British system evolved from both Celtic and Roman
origins).
16. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-54, at 189.
17. Phillip Wm. Lear & Stephanie Barber-Renteria, Split Estates and Severed Minerals: Rights of Access and Surface Use after the Divorce (and Other Leasehold AccessRelated Problems), 50 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 10, § 10.02(1)(b) (2004).
18. ANTHONY SCOTT, THE EVOLUTION OF RESOURCE PROPERTY RIGHTS 219
(2008) (“In 1848 miners discovered gold in California, which Mexico had only recently transferred into American possession. The successful prospectors found themselves in a legal vacuum regarding the right to their finds. . . .”).
19. The discovery of gold came about two weeks before the U.S. government acquired the territory from Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. GREGORY
YALE, LEGAL TITLES TO MINING CLAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS, IN CALIFORNIA,
UNDER THE MINING LAW OF CONGRESS, OF JULY, 1866 17 (1867).
20. Id.
21. Lacy, supra note 6, § 10.04(1).
22. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-54, at 216.
23. Id. at 218.
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ing Law allowed prospectors to stake claims for mineral rights, and
then combined the surface and mineral estates into one unified fee
when a patent was granted.24 Recognizing that this system allowed
valuable minerals to be passed from the public domain with virtually
no benefit to the government, Congress changed its strategy after
1900, severing and reserving to the government coal and other minerals in patents under the Stock Raising Homestead Act and other land
disposal statutes.25
B. Problems with Severance
In British precedents, the custom of allowing severance was called
“bounding,” and the excuse for allowing this abrogation of prior law
was (1) compensation directly to the surface owner and (2) “the benefit to the public” of having the mineral extracted. As one U.S. report
from the mid-1800s explains:
Bounding is a direct interference with the common law rights of
property: it takes from the owner of the land, who is unable or unwilling at a particular moment to dig for tin under his waste land,
the right to do so . . . and it vests in a stranger . . .; it empowers the
stranger not only to extract the mineral from beneath the surface,
but to enter on the surface, and cumber with machinery, buildings,
and refuse stuff, which the operations below occasion, and all of this
without the least regard to the convenience or interests of the
owner. The only things which make this reasonable are the render of
the toll tin to the owner [a kind of royalty-in-kind payment to the
surface owner], and the benefit to the public secured thereby in the
extraction of the mineral from the bowels of the earth. . . .26

One of the justifications for allowing this abrogation of the common
law of England no longer exists in the United States. As noted above,
U.S. government land grants severed the ownership of the minerals
from ownership of the surface, so many U.S. surface owners do not
receive any compensation in return for development of the minerals
beneath their lands. In addition, many surface owners might argue
that the surface areas being violated by mineral development are not
“waste land.”
Furthermore, both mining operations and surface uses have
changed dramatically since the law of severance evolved. Many min24. Act of May 10, 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2010).
25. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West 2007). The
Stock-Raising Homestead Act granted a homesteader a patent to the surface estate,
but reserved the right to the coal, oil, gas, and hardrock mineral rights to the United
States. Matthew L. King, Prospectors’ Access to Stock-Raising Homestead Act Lands,
20 COLO. LAW. 247, 247 (1991). See also Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to
Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 59–60 (1996).
26. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-54, at 207, 210–11 (citing Rogers v. Brenton, 10 Q.B. 26)
(emphasis added).
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ing methods involve extensive use of the surface and sometimes permanent contamination, while the shift of our society from agricultural
to urban means that more and more of the surface estate is employed
for valuable and intense surface uses, for residences and industry purposes. Consequently, the myth of noninterference and simple coexistence has dissolved, and the law of split estates has recognized
increased intensity in its long history of conflict between separate mineral and surface estate owners.27 The current fracking debate carries
on this long tradition.28
C. Dominant-Servient Estate Doctrine
As the demand for fossil fuels and minerals grew, severed mineral
estates earned nearly uncontested dominance over surface estates.29
Again, this shift toward mineral dominance evolved gradually over
many years. “[F]rom the earliest days of the common law,” a severed
mineral estate obtained an implied right to interfere with the surface
owner’s activities.30 Yet, in these early days, conflicts were seen as
minimal because “the value of [an] estate lay . . . in the arable qualities
of the surface,”31 and the mining was to be on waste lands.32
During these early times, “the attention of the courts was fixed
upon the surface,” and “the owner of the land” was the party that the
law recognized as having “the right of designating the reasonable location of the one right of way by necessity . . . .”33 However, around the
27. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple
Surface Use Issues, in SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, AND
SURFACE USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS, Paper 2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L.
Found. 2005). See also, Donald N. Zillman, The Common Law of Access and Surface
Use in Oil, Gas and Mining, in SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, AND SURFACE USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS, Paper 1A (Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Found. 2005). Conflicts exist even when the U.S. government is both
surface and mineral owner if separate agencies of the U.S. government manage the
minerals and the surface and these agencies have different missions. Lear & BarberRenteria, supra note 17, § 10.02(3)(a). See also Bureau of Land Management, Public
Land Statistics (2012), http://www.blm.gov/public_land_statistics/pls12/pls2012-web
.pdf.
28. See Matthew T. Milam, Texas Surface Damage Litigation, 61 ADVOCATEENVTL. LITIG. 40, 44 (2012); Barclay Nicholson & Kadian Blanson, Tracking Fracking
Case Law: Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 26 NAT’L RESOURCES & ENV’T 25, 29
(2011–2012).
29. See Gerald J. Schissler & Joy E. Hansen, 6-200 American Law of Mining
§ 200.02[1][b] (2d ed. 2013). But cf. discussion of the accommodation doctrine infra
Part II.D.
30. “It is a well established doctrine from the earliest days of the common law,
that the right to the minerals thus reserved carries with it the right to enter, dig and
carry them away, and all other such incidents thereto as are necessary to be used for
getting and enjoying them.” Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Tex. 217, 222 (1862).
31. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893).
32. See H.R. DOC. NO. 40-54, at 210 (citing Rogers v. Brenton, 10 Q.B. 26) (suggesting the mining would be conducted on “waste land”).
33. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 598.
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turn of the twentieth century, this balance shifted as the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted:
The comparatively recent development of the sciences of geology
and mineralogy, and the multiplication of mechanical devices for
penetrating the earth’s crust, have greatly changed the uses and the
values of lands. Tracks that were absolutely valueless, so far as the
surface was concerned, have come to be worth many times as much
per acre as the best farming lands in the commonwealth, because of
the rich deposits of coal, or iron, or oil, or gas known to underlie
them at various depths.34

Thus, minerals took on a “quasi public character” because they were
“absolutely essential to our common comfort and prosperity.”35 Even
with this new emphasis on minerals, the Pennsylvania court still attempted to “apply the law as to give each owner the right to enjoyment of his property or strata without impinging upon the right of
other owners.”36
About two decades later, the Circuit Court of Ohio recognized an
oil and gas operator’s right to the “reasonable use of the surface on
which to place derricks and other necessary machinery for drilling its
wells.”37 The court’s rationale for recognizing the mineral estate’s access interest was based on an analogy to a similar right to support held
by the surface owner.38 While this case may be the first to use the
dominant-servient terminology, in doing so the court continued to
seek balance by noting that “[t]hese various estates are mutually dominant and servient. . . .”39
34. Id.
35. Id. at 599.
36. Id. at 598. This case actually involved the right of the surface owner to reach
oil and gas below a coal seam when that surface owner had conveyed the right to coal
beneath the surface to another without explicitly reserving a right of access to lower
formations. Id. at 598–99.
37. Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 106, 112 (1911), aff’d, 106 N.E.
1053 (1913).
38. “We do not hesitate to enforce the servitude for support, whether subjacent or
adjacent, or to regulate the extent and manner in which it shall be rendered and enjoyed. With equal propriety and with equal ease we may enforce the servitude for
access and regulate the extent and manner in which it shall be rendered and enjoyed.”
Id. at 111 (citing Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. 597).
39. Chartiers Oil, 34 Ohio C.C. at 111 (emphasis added). However, one of the first
uses of the dominant estate and servient estate terminology may also have come in an
1839 case dealing with surface waters. Hebert v. Hudson, 13 La. 54 (1839) (stating
that the servient estate had an obligation to remove an embankment so the dominant
estate could use the natural flow of waters). The Court of Appeals of Kentucky used
the same language 16 years after Chartiers Oil, without quoting that case. It said:
“[T]he oil and gas constituted the dominant estate granted in the lease executed by
plaintiff, and the easements or rights over the surface was a servient estate and
granted as merely surface rights to be used by the grantee in the exercise of the right
to take and transport the oil and gas when found . . . .” Ky. Pipe Line Co. v. Hatfield, 3
S.W.2d 654, 654 (Ky. 1927).
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Thus, courts have long recognized that the right to develop the mineral estate includes an implied right to interfere with the surface
owner’s activities. As the balance in earlier cases shifted toward the
mineral estate, the language moved away from focusing on the surface
owner’s needs and instead allowed as much use of the surface “as necessary” for accessing and extracting the minerals.40 In addition, at the
pinnacle of the “dominant-servient estate” doctrine’s reign, the focus
was “unidimensional,”41 primarily on the needs of the mineral estate
owner. By using industry standards as the yardstick for reasonableness, courts guaranteed oil and gas operators access and excused the
operators from all or most compensation to surface owners for
damages.42
The precedents supporting the dominant-servient estate doctrine
are perhaps strongest in the context of oil and gas development. Once
oil and gas achieved the status of a severed mineral, it also gained the
advantage of becoming the dominant estate over the surface. As with
hard minerals, severance created an implied reservation of an access
right to extract the severed resources.43 To ensure access to these precious resources, the courts determined that policy called for the mineral estate to be the dominant estate, with an implied appurtenant
easement to use the surface estate.44 As discussed above, this easement, or right of access, was absolute, restricted only by “reasonableness.”45 However, as courts interpreted reasonableness strictly from
the mineral owner’s point of view, anything that was common industry
practice or determined “reasonably necessary” for extraction was
permitted.46
The main rationale for the dominant-servient estate doctrine was
the same as that for severance—that the public has a common interest
in developing mineral resources for the benefit of society.47 Denying
access would deprive the public “of the hidden treasures which the
40. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 598; Schissler & Hansen, supra note 29,
§ 200.02[1][b] (citing a Texas case saying courts give deference to the mineral lessee’s
view of reasonableness).
41. See Kramer, supra note 27, 2-20 to 2-30. See also, Zillman, supra note 27, at 11.
42. See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984); Gen.
Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1961). In Chartiers Block Coal, the
court implied that by giving away his right to the minerals, the surface owner also
gives away parts of his own rights unless he guarded those rights in the deed that
severed the minerals. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 598.
43. Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 106 (1911), aff’d, 106 N.E.
1053 (1913).
44. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599.
45. Burney, supra note 25, at 58 (citing Bruce Kramer, Conflicts Between the Exploitation of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation, 21
HOUS. L. REV. 49, 61 (1984)).
46. Id. (citing Kramer, supra note 45, at 61).
47. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103; Gen. Crude Oil Co., 344 S.W.2d at 669 (Tex.
1961); Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599.
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great laboratory of nature has provided for man’s use in the bowels of
the earth. . . . To place them beyond the reach of the public would be a
great public wrong.”48
The appurtenant easement part of the severance rationale was that
“a grant or reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the
[mineral owner] could not enter upon the land . . . to explore for and
extract the minerals granted or reserved.”49 In this way, many courts
recognized a “business, as well as a legal, standpoint” for making the
mineral estate dominant.50
In one form or another, the dominant-servient estate doctrine has
been followed in Arkansas,51 California,52 Colorado,53 Illinois,54 Kansas,55 Kentucky,56 Louisiana,57 Mississippi,58 Montana,59 New Mexico,60 North Dakota,61 Oklahoma,62 Oregon,63 Texas, and Wyoming.64
Application of the dominant-servient estate doctrine often means
harsh results for surface owners who do not control the minerals underneath their own lands.65 Reasonable use has generally been interpreted strictly from the mineral owner’s point of view, defined by
mineral industry practices.66 Industry practices that did not require
any accommodation or compensation have included: positioning a
drill rig adjacent to a home, splattering the doors and windows of the
home with slush and grease, and keeping the family awake with deaf48. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599.
49. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943). See also Lear & BarberRenteria, supra note 17, §10.02(3)(d) (citing Davison v. Reynolds, 103 S.E. 248, 250
(Ga. 1920) and Harris, 176 S.W.2d at 305); Rick D. Davis Jr., Private Lands—Surface
Access and Use, in SEVERED MINERALS, SPLIT ESTATES, RIGHTS OF ACCESS, AND
SURFACE USE IN MINERAL EXTRACTION OPERATIONS, Paper 9A (Rocky Mtn. Min.
L. Found. 2005).
50. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599.
51. E.g., Cranston v. Miller, 185 S.W.2d 920 (Ark. 1945).
52. E.g., Callahan v. Martin, 34 P.2d 788 (Cal. 1935).
53. E.g., Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 n.8 (Colo. 1997).
54. E.g., In re Payment of Taxes, 537 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
55. E.g., Powell v. Prosser, 753 P.2d 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
56. E.g., Lindsey v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1960).
57. E.g., Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App.
1958).
58. E.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Nunnery, 170 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1964).
59. E.g., Stokes v. Tutvet, 328 P.2d 1096 (Mont. 1958).
60. E.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985), abrogated by McNeill v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 182 P.3d 121(2008).
61. E.g., Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1969).
62. E.g., Wellsville Oil Co. v. Carver, 242 P.2d 151 (Okla. 1952).
63. E.g., Yaquina Bay Timber & Logging Co. v. Shiny Rock Mining Corp., 556
P.2d 672 (Or. 1976).
64. E.g., Holbrook v. Cont’l Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1955).
65. David E. Jackson, Surface Use: The Dominant Estate, Reasonable Use and Due
Regard, in 24TH ANNUAL ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND ENERGY RESOURCES LAW
COURSE ch. 13, 2 (State Bar of Tex. 2006).
66. See Kramer, supra note 45, at 61.
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ening, all night drilling.67 Similarly, an oil company had no obligation
to fence their operations “to prevent [the landowner’s] cattle from entering upon the land near the well and drinking oil on the ground.”68
In supporting this result, the court stated:
The petitioner [oil company] was lawfully in possession of the premises and being the owner of the dominant estate had the legal right
to use so much of the leased premises as were reasonably necessary
in its operation to the exclusion of respondent [the landowner], the
owner of the servient estate.69

Furthermore, an oil company had no obligation to restore the surface
of the land to its pre-drilling condition unless there was an express
provision in the oil and gas lease requiring it to do so.70
III.

OIL

AND

GAS SEVERANCE

Many credit “Colonel” Edwin Drake’s 1859 discovery of oil through
drilling in Titusville, Pennsylvania, as marking the birth of the oil and
gas industry in the United States.71 Yet, there is evidence of oil well
drilling in Washington County, Ohio, as early as 1833.72
Currently, there is little debate that U.S. law almost universally
treats oil and gas as a mineral that can be owned through a separate,
severed estate.73 This was not the case for the early decades of oil and
gas development. This Section will outline four phases in the tumultuous evolution of the status of oil and gas rights from: (1) the Era of
Definition; to (2) the Era of Scientific Awareness; through (3) the Era
of Conservation; to (4) today’s Environmental Era.74
67. See Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort
Worth 1919, writ dism’d). See also Burney, supra note 25, at 58–59.
68. Warren Petrol. Corp. v. Martin, 271 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. 1954).
69. Id. at 413.
70. Warren Petrol. Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1957).
71. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER
10–11 (1991). This source provides an excellent history of the oil and gas industry. See
also EDGAR WESLEY OWNE, TREK OF THE OIL FINDERS: A HISTORY OF EXPLORATION FOR PETROLEUM (1975).
72. EUGENE O. KUNTZ, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 7–8 (1987)
(citing to AM. J. SCI. 21–26 (July 1833)).
73. Throughout this Article, it is important to note that oil and gas law is a subset
of property law that varies state to state. This Article will deal only with broad trends
in these constructs for purposes of comparison with wind rights, and it is beyond the
scope of this Article to provide details about each state’s cases or statutes. Furthermore, sometimes the decisions of a state are contrary to the theory the state purports
to follow. Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrine in Disarray, 70
N.D.L. REV. 541, 553 (1994).
74. Burney, supra note 25, at 55–56 (citing Robert E. Sullivan, A Survey of Oil and
Gas Law in Montana as it Relates to the Oil and Gas Lease, 16 MONT. L. REV. 1, 16
(1955)). Sullivan defined three eras: The Era of Definition, the Era of Scientific
Awareness and the Era of Conservation. The fourth era mentioned by Burney and
used in this paper is the Environmental Era, coined by Burney from a work of James
M. Colosky, The Implied Covenant for Diligent and Prudent Operation in an Environmental Era, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15, § 15-2, 15-3 (1993).
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A. The Era of Definition
The decades between the discovery of oil in 1859, or 1833 depending on how one calculates, and the turn of the century is called the
“Era of Definition” in terms of oil and gas jurisprudence.75 During
this time, it was still relatively uncertain as to what oil and gas were,
much less how they should be regulated.76 As a result, during this
period, courts were mostly trying to determine the nature of oil and
gas to determine how best to analogize it.
Some of the earliest cases held that oil and gas was like percolating
groundwater and could not be owned beneath the ground. As one
case noted:
Oil is a fluid, like water, it is not the subject of property except while
in actual occupancy. A grant of water has long been considered not
to be a grant of anything for which an ejectment will lie. It is not a
grant of the soil upon which the water rests. . . . The nature of the
subject has more to do with the rights that are given over it, and to
us it appears that a right to take all the oil that may be found in a
tract of land cannot be a corporeal right.77

Alternatively, some courts applied the ad coelum doctrine to oil and
gas. Under ad coelum, landowners have rights in everything under
their land to the center of the earth.78 So, using ad coelum, a surface
owner could claim property rights in oil and gas in a manner similar to
other energy minerals such as coal. However, this model did not work
well because coal is a mineral in place, and oil and gas behave
differently.
During the Era of Definition, courts and property owners did not
have the scientific information to understand the deposition characteristics of oil and gas. It was thought at the time that oil and gas
flowed beneath the surface in rivers, moving slowly in something akin
to streambeds underneath vast surfaces.79 As a constantly moving
mineral, neither the analogy to coal nor the application of the ad
coelum doctrine worked.
75. Sullivan, supra note 74, at 16.
76. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVT’L L. 899, 903–05 (2005).
77. Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164, 168 (1840) (emphasis added).
78. Cujus est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. Translated, it means “for
whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.” Thus, the ad
coelum doctrine covers ownership not only in the land below, but also above, so it
could apply to wind rights as well.
79. Polston, supra note 73, at 551. Another popular belief was that oil was abundant and inexhaustible, “capable of supporting an infinite number of wells and opportunities for investment.” As a result, developers wanted law to develop that would
allow individuals an absolute right to drill without being liable to neighbors. Thomas
A. Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurisprudence: Past as Prologue,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 381 (2010).
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So as another alternative, courts chose to compare oil and gas to
wild animals, or animals ferae naturae. Animals ferae naturae cannot
be owned by an individual while in a state of nature, but are instead
owned by the state.80 The animals then become the property of the
first person to “reduce them to possession.”81 Like wild animals and
unlike other minerals, oil and gas have “the power and the tendency
to escape without the volition of the owner.”82 As such, oil and gas
rights seemed best classified as “minerals ferae naturae” that would be
treated just like wild animals83—owned by the state until reduced to
possession by an individual.
B. The Era of Scientific Awareness
Sometime early in the twentieth century, new science about the nature of oil and gas helped clear up some misconceptions.84 People
realized that oil and gas do not actually flow in streams underground.
However, given the right conditions, they could migrate and be
trapped under pressure in airtight formations and remain fixed in
these places until a low pressure point was introduced into the formation.85 Once this realization came about, courts recognized some of
the problems with the minerals ferae naturae legal model that assumed
oil and gas moved freely between properties.86 Therefore, they
needed another legal theory that would apply to oil and gas severance
and possession. This period of re-exploring the status of oil and gas
property rights lasted about three decades from 1900 until the mid1930s and was known as the “Era of Scientific Awareness.”87
80. Polston, supra note 73, at 552.
81. Id.
82. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889). See also Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50, 52 (Pa. 1922).
83. Westmoreland, 18 A. at 725. See also A. W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil
and Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370,
370–71 (1938) (“as late as 1921, one of the Texas courts indulge in the fanciful statement that oil and gas are supposed to percolate restlessly about under the surface of
the earth, even as the birds fly from field to field and the beast roam from forest to
forest”).
84. See Polston, supra note 73, at 552.
85. Id. See also Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
86. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208–11 (1900). In Ohio Oil, the
Supreme Court recognized that if oil and gas were minerals ferae naturae, lawmakers
could prevent everyone from seeking to reduce the minerals to possession in order to
protect the minerals from undue destruction and allow the public to enjoy the minerals. Id. at 209–10. “No devastating of private property under such a condition can be
conceived, because the public are the owners, and the enacting by the state of a law as
to the public ownership is but the discharge of the governmental trust resting in the
state as to the property of that character.” Id. at 209. But by depriving the oil and gas
producers of their right to possession of the minerals below, they would be wrongfully
taking private property. Id.
87. Sullivan, supra note 74, at 16. The time period from approximately the turn of
the 20th century until about 1980 has also been called “the Great Era.” RICHARD C.
MAXWELL, OIL AND GAS LAW AT THE END OF ITS GREAT ERA, NATURAL RE-
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With the rejection of the minerals ferae naturae theory,88 several
courts reverted to the ad coelum, or unified fee theory. These courts
held that oil and gas were part of the surface-owner’s entire estate.89
Therefore, a conveyance of oil and gas rights while they remained in
place was consequently a conveyance of an interest in realty.90 While
the unified fee model was simple for lawmakers, it still created
problems as a construct for the ownership of oil and gas.91
Like hard minerals such as gold, oil and gas can stay in place for
long geologic periods if they are not disturbed. However, pumping oil
and gas out of a well creates a point of low pressure.92 In trying to
obtain the resources below a particular tract of land, this low pressure
point could cause the oil and gas from an adjoining tract to migrate
over and also be captured.93 Therefore, an ad coelum mineral-inplace regime fails to completely address the ownership issues raised in
extracting oil and gas.
Because of the migratory nature of oil and gas, the “rule of capture”
was introduced.94 It was meant to alter the ad coelum theory so that
mineral owners would have not only the right to extract the minerals
under their own tracts of land, but also have the legal right to extract
“all of the oil and gas [from adjacent properties] that will [also] flow
out of the well on one’s land.”95
Under the rule of capture, ownership of any given quantity of oil or
gas may be obtained by the one producing a well; similarly, ownership
of any given quantity of oil or gas may be lost by a neighboring mineral owner.96 The rule of capture allowed this “invasion” of adjacent
SOURCES POLICY AND LAW, TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 94, 96 (Lawrence J Macdonnel
& Sarah F. Bates, eds. 1993). “The great Era of oil and gas jurisprudence arose
quickly, as sudden supplies and emerging markets for oil and gas caused disputes
among property owners. Courts were challenged to provide answers to questions
about the relative rights and liabilities incident to the production of these coveted
resources. The common law provided few direct answers. To fill the void, judges
trained in the shadow of Langdell strictly followed the dictates of legal formalism and
invoke the logical tool of analogy.” Burney, supra note 25, at 9.
88. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 209; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353
S.W.2d 870, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
89. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 721 (Tex. 1915).
90. Id. at 720.
91. See Polston, supra note 73, at 552.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889). Mitchell believes that the change in scientific thought has little to do with the
rule of capture, instead stating that in the thirty years between the discovery of oil in
Pennsylvania and the first articulation of the rule of capture, the business of oil leasing, subleasing, and investment led to the rule of capture in practice. This established
practice was then adopted by the courts in Westmoreland & Cambira Natural Gas Co.
v. De Witt. Mitchell, supra note 79, at 381.
95. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935); Polston,
supra note 73, at 552.
96. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Tex. 1948).
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owners’ space if the minerals could be obtained through the wellowner’s well and this “invasion” was limited only by the possibility
that the adjacent landowners had the right to exercise the same right
of capture, drilling their own wells and capturing as many minerals as
they could.97
Application of the rule of capture made the right to sever minerals
from the land much easier than the minerals ferae naturae model did.
Under the rule of capture, owners of the fee in land with oil or gas
beneath it also had property ownership rights in that oil and gas. Such
owners were then able to sever the estate in the surface from that in
the oil and gas beneath it.98 This severance created two separate estates, held by separate titles.99
Some states did not adopt the unified fee doctrine, instead continuing to classify oil and gas as minerals ferae naturae.100 Regardless of
the theory, courts applied the rule of capture to resolve the ownership
issue.101
C. The Era of Conservation
The rule of capture resulted in extensive waste of oil.102 Once the
mistakes of the early twentieth century had been made, courts and
legislatures attempted to rectify them.103 This era was partially initiated with the formation of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
(now the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission or
(“IOGCC”)) in 1935.104 Because of its focus on eliminating waste,
97. Alan J. Alexander, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and a
Severable Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429, 434 (2011); DuVivier,
supra note 2, at 90. See also Brown, 83 S.W.2d. 935; R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361
S.W.2d 560, 568–69 (Tex. 1962).
98. DuVivier, supra note 2, at 90. See, e.g., Luman v. Davis, 196 Pac. 1078 (Kan.
1921); Hoskins v. N. Lee Oil & Gas Co., 240 S.W. 377 (Ky. 1922); Weaver v. Richards,
120 N.W. 818 (Mich. 1909); Buck v. Walker, 132 N.W. 205 (Minn. 1911); Chartiers Oil
Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. 106 (1911), aff’d, 106 N.E. 1053 (1913); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 P. 468 (Okla. 1917); Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50 (Pa.
1922); Murray v. Allred, 43 S.W. 355 (Tenn. 1897); Hynson v. Gulf Prod. Co., 232
S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1921, writ ref’d); Ramage v. S. Penn Oil Co.,
118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
99. Renfro v. Hanon, 130 N.E. 740, 741 (Ill. 1921).
100. See, e.g., Brown v. Spillman 155 U.S. 665 (1895); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,
254 U.S. 300 (1920).
101. Kramer & Anderson, supra note 76, at 906. To reconcile conflicting concepts,
some courts determined that minerals ferae naturae are part of the land while they are
in the land, so owners of the surface estate have ownership interests that they can sell.
H.J., Severance of title or rights to oil and gas in place from title to surface, 29 A.L.R.
586 (1924). A minority of jurisdictions continued to classify oil and gas as minerals
ferae naturae without finding the need to allow severance. See, e.g., Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920).
102. Alexander, supra note 97, at 434–35.
103. DuVivier, supra note 2, at 91.
104. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 13 (May 2009), [hereinafter STATE OIL],
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this era between the mid-1930s and 1960 came to be known as the
“Era of Conservation.”105
The “pell-mell development” of oil and gas because of the rule of
capture resulted in “[waste of] large amounts of petroleum both above
and below ground.”106 Above ground, overproduction meant that all
the oil produced could not be transported or sold.107 Consequently,
much was physically wasted, some standing in pools at the surface and
leaching back into the ground.108
Below ground, an oil and gas reservoir is best recovered by maintaining controlled and steady pressures.109 Instead, the rule of capture
incentivized developers to place production wells that straddled both
sides of a boundary line, each attempting to capture the resource beneath the neighboring property.110 Pumping out a reservoir from different low pressure points can mix the oil and salt water and prevents
effective and complete recovery of the resource.111 As an example
from Spindletop, “[r]apid and uncontrolled production depleted the
field’s pressure so quickly that by 1903, the field was in decline and
within ten years, Spindletop was a virtual ghost town.”112 Perhaps
most shocking is that the field could no longer be developed even
though “[l]ess than five percent of the field’s oil was produced.”113
In addition to physical waste, the rule of capture also resulted in
economic waste of oil.114 From the period of 1947 to 1952, “$100 million a year was expended for the drilling of unnecessary wells.”115
Overproduction also led to a saturation of the market and artificially
low prices.116 As an example, oil in the Seminole field in Oklahoma
http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/oil-and-gas-regulation-report-fi
nal-with-cover-5-27-20091.pdf.
105. Burney, supra note 25, at 55.
106. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 259 (3d ed. 2010).
107. Alexander, supra note 97, at 435.
108. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 233 (1932) (“In Oklahoma,
prior to the passage of the Act, large quantities of oil produced in excess of transportation facilities or demand therefor were stored in surface tanks, and by reason of
seepage, rain, fire and evaporation enormous waste occurred.”). See also BOSSELMAN
ET AL., supra note 106, at 302.
109. Champlin Ref. Co., 286 U.S. at 228 (“Uncontrolled flow of flush or semiflush
wells for any considerable period exhausts an excessive amount of pressure, wastefully uses the gas, and greatly lessens ultimate recovery.”).
110. Alexander, supra note 97, at 434.
111. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN
TEXAS: A STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 20–29
(1986). See also FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 292–95, 298–99 (2d ed. 2006).
112. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 254.
113. Id.
114. Alexander, supra note 97, at 435.
115. Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property
Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99, 111 (1952).
116. Alexander, supra note 97, at 435.
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and East Texas dropped from “three dollars a barrel in 1920 to as low
as ten cents a barrel in the early 1930s.”117 At one point in Spindletop, Texas, one could buy an entire barrel of oil for less than one
would pay for a cup of water.118
States responded to this waste through legislation—including wellspacing rules, conservation statutes, and orders from regulatory agencies, such as the Texas Railroad Commission.119 While a few states
enacted statutes before 1900,120 most states did not feel the need to
address conservation until the 1930s to 1950s.121 One of the first remedies employed was “prorationing” orders that enforced proportional
taking from each well and lease in a unit and restricted well production to below a field’s Maximum Efficient Rate of Recovery
(“MER”).122 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld some of the first of the
prorationing orders on the basis that they prevented waste in a manner that protected correlative rights between different owners.123
Although the Court found that the commission’s orders were not
“for the purpose of controlling the price of crude oil or its products, or
of eliminating . . . any producer or refiner from competition . . .,”
commentators have noted that enforcement of these statutes was “effective in raising the price of oil.”124 As an example, in August of
1931, the governor of Texas declared martial law to shut down every
well in the East Texas field when the price dropped below ten cents
per barrel. Opposition to market-demand prorationing quieted when
the price rebounded as military officers running the prorationing office reopened the wells at a fraction of their previous production
rate.125
With all of the waste created by the rule of capture, several states
felt the need for stronger regulations. As a result, Oklahoma, Texas,
Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, and Kansas formed the Interstate Oil
117. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 261.
118. Id. at 254 (“A glut of oil dropped the price to as little as three cents a barrel,
while a cup of water cost five cents.”).
119. Id. at 261.
120. Walter L. Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes
for the Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1938) (Pennsylvania
enacted the first conservation statute requiring the plugging of holes and casing of
wells in 1878. New York followed suit in 1879, Ohio in 1883, and West Virginia in
1891.). Id.
121. STATE OIL, supra note 104, at 10–14. Some states, such as Oklahoma, California, and Texas enacted regulation programs earlier, but these early conservations statutes often created organizations that lacked specific authority to promulgate
regulations or were general statutes that tended to leave enforcement in local or
county control. Id. at 13.
122. See generally Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 226–27
(1932). See also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 260–62.
123. Champlin Ref. Co., 286 U.S. at 230; BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 263.
124. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 263–66.
125. Id. at 266; James H. Keahey, The Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act: End of
an Era, 4 NAT. RES. L. 359, 360–61 (1971).
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Compact Commission (“IOCC”) in 1935.126 The IOCC then helped
create a framework to promote the conservation of oil resources
through stricter regulations.127 The goal was to prevent waste while
protecting landowners’ and royalty owners’ rights.128 In order to further these goals, the IOCC developed a set of model regulations for
the states to use as a pattern for their own regulatory frameworks.129
Due to the onset of World War II, however, the IOCC did not come
out with its actual Model Regulation Statutes until 1949,130 after
which most states followed suit and passed statutes establishing regulatory agencies.131
Some of the key provisions in conservation statutes were regulations that controlled the spacing, drilling and construction of extraction wells; created specifications for permitting; prevented both
physical and economic waste; regulated the handling of waste fluids;
reserved the right to limit production from particular wells; and mandated pooling and unitization.132 Pooling133 and unitization134 effectively substituted the competitive rule of capture with cooperative
development.135 While no notable rules or limitations on severance
were passed along with conservation statutes, the general decrease in
waste through conservation regulations was the useful trademark of
this era.
D. The Environmental Era
The late 1960s ushered in an era of environmental awareness.136 In
the oil and gas context, the Environmental Era, which some commentators say continues today,137 began focusing not only on oil and gas
126. STATE OIL, supra note 104, at 14.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Id. at 13.
130. John F. Welborn, Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations by
State Conservation Agencies, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14, § 14.02(1) (1992).
131. STATE OIL, supra note 104, at 14; Angela Neese, The Battle Between the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and Local Governments: A Call for a
New and Comprehensive Approach, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 575 (2005).
132. STATE OIL, supra note 104, at 17.
133. Pooling is the combining of small tracts of land into an acreage that is sufficiently large to both secure a well permit and meet the spacing rules of a respective
conservation commission. It prevents excessive drilling while still guaranteeing that
each mineral owner receives an appropriate share of royalties. WEAVER, supra note
111, at 7.
134. Id. Unitization, on the other hand, combines many spacing units into a
fieldwide unit for the coordinated operation of several tracts on a reservoir, usually to
conduct secondary recovery operations.
135. For in-depth analysis of pooling and unitization, see generally id. For a summary of different types of pooling and unitization, see Nancy Saint-Paul, 4 SUMMERS
OIL AND GAS § 54.2 Methods of Pooling and unitizing oil and gas production (3d ed.
2013).
136. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act of 1969 and subsequent legislation.
137. Burney, supra note 25, at 56.
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waste, but on the impact of oil and gas development on the environment. This era also tempered some of the adverse effects that severance has had over the rights of surface owners.
The Environmental Era saw the proliferation of statutes that regulated oil and gas’s impacts on the surface and the environment.138
Surface damage statutes give mineral owners the right to use the surface, but hold them strictly liable for any damages to the surface that
an oil and gas operation caused.139 State statutes that provide for surface damages enumerate the specific types of damages for which the
mineral owners may be liable.140
Dormant mineral statutes were another innovation. Under dormant mineral statutes, ownership of the mineral estate reverts to the
surface owner if the severed mineral interest is unused or undeveloped for a designated period of time.141 While surface damage statutes give surface owners some monetary compensation for the use of
their lands, dormant mineral statutes ensure that valuable minerals
will be developed or returned to the surface owners.142
In addition, new statutes helped define the rights of surface and
mineral owners.143 For example, notice statutes require a mineral
owner to provide notice to the surface owner before going onto the
surface owner’s land.144
The key common law doctrine that came about in the Environmental Era is the accommodation doctrine,145 which requires mineral estate owners to exercise “due regard” for the rights of surface
owners.146 The Texas case of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones is credited with
establishing this doctrine in 1971.147 The rule the Getty Oil court outlined was that “where there is an existing use by the surface owner
138. Lear & Barber-Renteria, supra note 17, § 10.02(5)(b).
139. Burney, supra note 25, at 72; Lear & Barber-Renteria, supra note 17,
§ 10.02(5)(b)(i).
140. Lear & Barber-Renteria, supra note 17, § 10.02(5)(b)(i). See, e.g., N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 38-11.1-01 to -10 (2004 & Supp. 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 45-5A-1 to -8
(2004 & Supp. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to -508 (2013); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to -608 (2013); W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-7-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2009
& Supp. 2013).
141. Lear & Barber-Renteria, supra note 17, § 10.02(5)(b)(ii).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 10.02(5)(b).
144. Id. § 10.02(5)(b)(i).
145. Burney, supra note 25, at 60.
146. Id.
147. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971). In Getty Oil, the surface owner had a rotating irrigation system that extended seven feet above the surface. The mineral owner then attempted to install two oil pumping units that were
taller than the irrigation system, making the surface owner’s system useless. The mineral owner claimed that it held the dominant estate and use of the tall pumping units
was within the mineral owner’s right. The court responded by redefining the scope of
a mineral owner’s surface easement. It stated that “where there is an existing use by
the surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under
the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the lessee
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which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under
the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.”148
These Environmental Era reforms have helped shift the impacts of
severance from a unidimensional focus on the needs of the mineral
estate owner to a more “multidimensional” approach.149 Yet, the accommodation doctrine does not restrict mineral development altogether.150 While many may see these developments as steps forward
because they create more balance between the right of the mineral
owner to extract its minerals against the disruption to the surface
owner’s existing uses of the surface,151 they do not change the basic
dominant-servient estate dynamic in significant ways. For example,
under the accommodation doctrine, the surface owner may not stop
development by the mineral owner, only request some accommodation for existing surface uses. In addition, the surface owner still retains the burden of proof.152
IV.

WIND SEVERANCE

This Section will look first at a brief history of wind power. Next, it
will compare wind energy rights with the above evolution of oil and
gas rights.
A. Background
Wind is one of the oldest forms of energy that humans have captured. Egyptians harnessed the wind to sail boats as far back as 3100
B.C.E., and both the Chinese and Persians used windmills to pump
water as early as 200 B.C.E.153 The first windmill for electricity prowhereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface
may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.” Id. at 620–21.
148. Id. at 622. Model Surface Use and Mineral Dev. Accommodation Act, 14
U.L.A. 100 (1995) (clarifying accommodation doctrine criteria and suggesting model
legislation in 1990).
149. See Kramer, supra note 27, at 2-20 to 2-30. See also Zillman, supra note 27, at
1-1. See, e.g., Texas Genco, LP v. Valence Operating Co., 187 S.W.3d 118, 123–25
(Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied). Will Russ, Inheriting the Wind: A Brief Guide to
Resolving Split Estate Issues when Developing Renewable Projects, in ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON RENEWABLE ELEC. ENERGY LAW, DEV. & INV., 5
MIN. L. SERIES 5-8 (2013).
150. Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 622.
151. Russ, supra note 149, at 5-8.
152. Id.; Douglas R. Hafer, Daniel B. Mathis & Logan W. Simmons, A Practical
Guide to Operator/Surface-Owner Disputes and the Current State of the Accommodation Doctrine, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 47, 58–59 (2010).
153. ERNEST E. SMITH, STEVE K. DEWOLF, RODERICK E. WETSEL & BECKY H.
DIFFEN, TEXAS WIND LAW § 1.01, at 1-1 (LexisNexis 2013).
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duction was built in Scotland in 1887,154 and Charles F. Brush of
Cleveland, Ohio, designed and constructed a 12 kilowatt wind turbine
for the production of electricity in the U.S. in 1888.155
Despite these early beginnings, wind was not widely used once the
Industrial Revolution and new advances in technology required the
day-and-night-any-weather delivery of energy that fossil fuels, which
were cheap and abundant at this time, could provide.156 The 1970 oil
embargos changed that.157 The fear of being cut off from petroleum
sources caused both the United States and Europe to begin again to
explore the use of wind power as an alternative for electricity
production.158
The first commercially viable wind farms for producing electricity in
the United States were established in the 1980s, but these farms had a
slow start.159 It was not until states began passing Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”) in the mid-1990s that U.S. wind capacity truly
expanded.160 In 1998, the United States had approximately 2,000
megawatts (“MW”)161 of installed wind capacity; by the end of the
third quarter of 2013, that number had grown to 60,078 MW162 with an
additional 2,327 MW more under construction.163
Currently, all but thirteen states have RPS goals or mandates to
encourage utilities to use renewable energy sources,164 and most of
these RPSs include wind as a qualifying resource to meet those mandates. By the year 2030, 20% of U.S. electrical energy needs could be
supplied by wind power. The United States has abundant wind
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1-2.
156. K.K. DuVivier & Roderick E. Wetsel, Jousting at Windmills: When Wind
Power Development Collides with Oil, Gas, and Mineral Development, 55 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-5 (2009).
157. SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 1.01.
158. Id.
159. Alexander, supra note 97, at 436.
160. David Hurlbut, A Look Behind the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard: A
Case Study, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 129, 129 (2008).
161. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 5, fig ES-2 (Dec. 2008), http://
www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/42864.pdf.
162. U.S. Wind Industry Third Quarter Market Report 4, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/AWEA%203Q%20Wind%20Energy%
20Industry%20Market%20Report%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [hereinafter
AWEA, Third Quarter]; see also Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY
ASS’N http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5059&navItem
Number=742 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (reporting 60,007 MW as the amount at the
end of 2012. This number is from the thirty-nine states plus Puerto Rico that have
installed capacity.).
163. AWEA, Third Quarter, supra note 162, at 7.
164. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014); Rob
Wile, Here’s How much Your State Cares About Climate Change [Map], BUSINESS
INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/map-of-renewable-portfoliostandards-2013-9.
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reserves,165 and wind is “the fastest growing source of new power
generation.”166
The current leader in wind energy is Texas, with 12,214 MW of installed wind capacity and 7,690 wind turbines.167 In 2012, 7.4% of
Texas’s electricity was provided by wind.168 Second to Texas is California, which led the world in wind energy development throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s.169 California is currently ranked second
in the U.S. for installed wind capacity (5,544 MW) and has the most
wind turbines in the nation (11,753 turbines).170 Wind is an increasingly popular option as an energy source due to its renewable nature
and the strong potential that the United States has to develop wind
energy facilities.
B. The Era of Definition
It is perhaps unsurprising that wind power is in the same phase of
jurisprudence as oil and gas was in its first thirty years—with courts
simply struggling to create a legal definition for each of these new
resources.171 As with the early days of oil and gas, there is now little
concurrence in how wind rights should be categorized,172 not helped
by the fact that very few courts have dealt with this issue.173 What is a
bit surprising, however, is that many of the same analogies for the
ownership status of oil and gas are also being used for wind power.
165. TRIEU MAI, ET AL., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 9, 12 (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/52409-ES.pdf. NREL’s
study provides a scenario for up to 80% of US electricity generation from renewable
sources by 2050, 50% of which would be a combination of wind and solar power. Id.
at 2.
166. JEFFREY LOGAN & STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34546,
WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ISSUES, at Summary pg. 3 (June 20, 2008). See also 20% Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing Wing Energy’s Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY
(2008), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf.
167. State Wind Energy Statistics: Texas, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www
.awea.org/Resources/state.aspx?ItemNumber=5183 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
168. Id.
169. State Wind Energy Statistics: California, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://
www.awea.org/Resources/state.aspx?ItemNumber=5232 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
170. Id. (The next top states in installed wind capacity are Iowa with 5,133 MW,
Illinois with 3,568 MW, Oregon with 3,153 MW, Oklahoma with 3,134 MW, Minnesota with 2,987 MW, Washington with 2, 808 MW, Kansas with 2,713 MW, and Colorado with 2,301 MW); Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5059&navItemNumber=742 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
171. See, e.g, Terry E. Hogwood, Against the Wind, 26 STATE BAR OF TEX.: OIL,
GAS, & ENERGY RES. L. SEC. 6, 6–15 (Dec. 2004); Alexander, supra note 97, at
431–32; Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America’s Energy Future: the Future of
Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 532 (2008).
172. Russ, supra note 149, at 5-5.
173. Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct.
App. 1997). As a result of its position, California is one of the few states whose courts
have even considered the severance of wind rights. See infra Part III.B–C.
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Texas seemed to recognize a right to wind access as early as 1904.174
Although the court did not expressly state that there was such a right,
it found that a plaintiff could properly allow evidence to support his
claim for damages resulting from the construction of an embankment
that blocked wind flows to the plaintiff’s windmill.175 Moreover,
under traditional theories of property law, including the ad coelum
doctrine, the owner of the surface estate has a property right in the
wind flowing over and above his or her property.176 However, it has
been proposed that the ad coelum doctrine only establishes the right
to develop the space above one’s property in building the windmill
and does not include a right in the wind itself.177
As in the early days of oil and gas jurisprudence, wind has been
compared to animals ferae naturae. Wind may have even more similarities to wild animals than oil and gas: neither are confined to any
one area, and their specific location and movements are not easily
predictable.178 If this theory were adopted, essentially naming wind as
a mineral ferae naturae, wind would be the property of the state until
reduced to possession at the time it generated electricity in turning the
blades of a turbine.179 Essentially, a wind right would not be a corporeal right, and only an easement in gross180 or profit à prendre181 in
the mineral rights could be conveyed, not title.182
Wind has been compared to oil and gas itself, ownable in fee simple
absolute, but subject to the rule of capture.183 In fact, the first case to
address the property status of modern wind power rights did analogize
wind to oil and gas.184 The Contra Costa Water District v. Vaquero
Farms185 court agreed with the Water District in that “the right to
generate electricity from windmills harnessing the wind, and the right
to sell the power so generated, is no different, either in law or com174. See generally Choctaw, Okla. & Tex. R.R. Co. v. True, 80 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Fort Worth 1904, no writ).
175. Id. at 121.
176. TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., CAPTURING THE
WIND: THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW ENERGY SOURCE IN TEXAS, NO. 80-9, at 17 (July
8, 2008), available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/Wind80-9.pdf (citing Alexander, supra note 97, at 444).
177. Alexander, supra note 97, at 444–45.
178. Id. at 446.
179. See State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.).
See also Alexander, supra note 97, at 447; SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 4.01.
180. An easement in gross is not attached to a neighboring piece of land like an
easement appurtenant, but instead runs with a person.
181. This would be similar to a hunting lease.
182. SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 4.02.
183. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008);
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 719–20 (Tex. 1915). SMITH ET AL., supra note
153, § 4.02.
184. Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 290 (Ct.
App. 1997); DuVivier, supra note 2, at 87.
185. Contra Costa, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272.
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mon sense, from the right to pump and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface natural gas by means of wells and pumps.”186
Water has also been put forth as an alternative for understanding
ownership rights in wind.187 This construct, however, creates
problems as to whether one should use the law of groundwater or
surface water; then if surface water is used, whether the doctrine of
riparianism or prior appropriation applies. One commentator prefers
groundwater law, as it establishes a fee simple absolute in the groundwater and also utilizes the rule of capture,188 but includes a limitation
that an owner can “capture and reduce the water to possession unless
done with the purpose of maliciously injuring his neighbor or wasting
the water.”189 This could prevent malicious or wasteful uses.
Although flowing surface water may be a more apt analogy for wind
than subterranean water, there is currently no uniform water regulation between states.190 The only similarity between states is that flowing water is state water until the state grants the right to extract and
use the water.191 Despite these differences, the only other U.S. case
that has dealt with the ownership status of wind rights, Romero v.
Bernell,192 chose to analogize wind to water and apply the principle of
prior appropriation to it.193 The Romero court stated that “[w]hile
New Mexico has no relevant statutory or case law on the subject, it
does not appear minerals in the ground are the appropriate commod186. Id. at 278.
187. See, e.g., Thaddeus Baria, Up the Creek with a Paddle: Water Doctrine as a
Basis for Small Wind Energy, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 141 (2009).
188. See Alexander, supra note 97.
189. Id. at 448 (citing Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75,
75–77 (Tex. 1999)).
190. See, e.g., A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:7
(Thomson Reuters 2013) (“A proprietor of lands on banks of a river has naturally an
equal right to use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it
was want to run, without diminution or alteration . . . . He has no property in the
water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along.”); Id. § 5:8 (Colorado and its
arid neighbors rejected the dual system of the Pacific Coast states, thus rejecting common law riparian rights with the rationale that the federal government silently acquiesced in rejecting them and after 1866 gave congressional consent to state control.);
see also State v. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983) writ denied sub. nom. Young v. Southwestern Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 466 U.S. 944
(1984); TARLOCK, supra § 4:6 (Some states follow the “English” or Absolute Ownership Rule of capture limiting use to owners of land overlying the groundwater.); Id. at
6:5 (New Mexico and other states follow the American or Reasonable Use Rule.); see
also N.M. Const. art. XVI § 3; WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 8-31 (Robert E. Beck &
Amy K. Kelly eds., 1991 ed.).
191. SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 4.01.
192. Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D.N.M. 2009) (court allowed partition of property saying wind rights are not comparable to mineral right but instead
inchoate until vested by being reduced possession when harvested to generate
energy).
193. There was a case in Kansas that had the option of dealing with wind rights, but
the court decided the case on a different issue. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Wabanasee Cnty., 264 P.3d 989 (Kan. 2011).
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ity to create a legal paradigm to analyze wind power. . . . Wind is never
embedded in the real estate; rather, it is more like water or wild animals which traverse the surface and which do not belong to the fee
owner until reduced to possession.”194 Romero then went on to say
that the right to harvest wind and the right to appropriate water were
similar, because the right in both vests when the resource is employed
for a useful or beneficial purpose, but not before.195
C. Era of Scientific Awareness, Conservation, and Environment
Oil and gas has had more than 150 years to reach its current legal
status. Using the history above, oil and gas had the advantage of a
slow evolution moving first through efforts to define its essential nature and then moving on to defining a construct—the rule of capture—to facilitate its development, regardless of the ownership
definitions. As the above history of oil and gas shows, oil and gas
achieved a reign of dominance, that still remains today, before the
rights were reined in somewhat by conservation and environmental
concerns.
The haphazard and destructive components of the oil and gas evolution process have incentivized current lawmakers to jump in to proactively rein in wind rights before they also can obtain a status of
dominance comparable to oil and gas. While some of this may be warranted by the conservation and environmental concerns that oil and
gas development have created, the collapsing of three generations of
oil and gas development into one for wind may also be curtailing development of the wind resource, which is much more benign to the
environment than its legally-privileged fossil fuel predecessors.
For example, wind power is arguably still struggling through an
“Era of Scientific Awareness.” Because so little is known about the
way wind reacts in turbines, it is still the subject of numerous scientific
studies.196
194. Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Anna Fitch, Joseph B. Olson, & Julie K. Lundquist, Representation of
wind farms in climate models, 26 J. CLIMATE 6439 (2013); Daniel T. Kaffine, Brannin
J. McBee, & Jozef Lieskovsky, Emissions savings from wind power generation in
Texas, 34(1) THE ENERGY J. 155 (2013); Matthew L. Aitken, Michael E. Rhodes, &
Julie. K. Lundquist, Performance of a wind-profiling lidar in the region of wind turbine
rotor disks, 29 J. ATMOSPHERIC & OCEANIC TECH., 347 (2012); Somnath Baidya Roy
& Justin J. Traiteur, Impacts of wind farms on surface air temperatures, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 17899 (2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/
doi/10.1073/pnas.1000493107; US DOE 2010, New Wind Resource Maps and Wind
Potential Estimates for the United States, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/filter_detail.asp?itemid=2542; US DOE 2008, USDOE Workshop Report: Research
Needs for Wind Resource Characterization, NREL REPORT NO. TP-500-43521 at 116
(2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/ce/wrc_workshop/main.cfm; US DOE 2008,
20% Wind Energy by 2030, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind_2030
.html; Somnath Baidya Roy, Stephen W. Pacala, & Robert L. Walko, Can wind farms
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Similarly, wind energy appears to be susceptible to the same potential for physical and economic waste as oil and gas. Inefficient siting
of wind farms could waste wind by preventing farms and turbines
from harnessing the energy of the wind.197 A lack of regulation of
wind could lead to economic waste such as local market saturation or
physical waste through transmission constraints, production variability, and inefficient storage.198 Once the appropriate scientific information is available, wind might benefit from unitization-like statutes
similar to those enacted during oil and gas’s “Era of Conservation.”
In addition, as we are still in “the Environmental Era,” wind power
has faced heightened scrutiny on the environmental front. A couple
of examples include greater regulation of wind at the local level,199
longer permitting time required for renewable energy projects by federal regulators,200 and the heightened bird study standards for wind
affect local meteorology?, 109 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH D19101 (2004); David W.
Keith, et al., The influence of large-scale wind power on global climate, 101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. USA 16115 (2004); Evaluation of the Weather
Research and Forecasting (WRF) model on forecasting low-level jets: Implications for
wind energy, WIND ENERGY.
197. Troy A. Rule, Wind Rights Under Property Law: Answers Still Blowing in the
Wind, 26 PROB. & PROP. 56, 57 (2012); Alexander, supra note 97, at 438; Kimberly E.
Diamond & Ellen J. Crivella, Wind Turbine Wakes, Wake Effect Impacts, and Wind
Leases: Using Solar Access Law as the Model for Capitalizing on Wind Rights during
the Evolution of Wind Policy Standards, 22 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 195 (2011),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/delpf/vol22/iss1/4; Lauren Donovan, Two
Energy Projects Competing for the Wind, BISMARK TRIBUNE (Feb. 22, 2008), available
at http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/two-energy-projects-competing-for-thewind/article_4bd1f0d6-6616-512b-970f-b4301800f774.html.
198. Alexander, supra note 97, at 439.
199. As an example, thirteen of the fifteen counties in Colorado that have wind
turbines have setback requirements. In contrast, only eleven of the forty-seven counties with oil and gas wells have setback requirements for those. Wyoming is even more
dramatic: twenty-three counties have oil and gas wells and only one county has a
setback requirement for such wells; in contrast eight of the twelve Wyoming counties
with wind farms have setback requirements for turbines.
200. Neal McAliley, Federal Environmental Permitting of Renewable Energy
Projects, EL DAILY AND ENERGY MANAGER TODAY (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.envi
ronmentalleader.com/2011/08/02/federal-environmental-permitting-of-renewable-energy-projects (“[R]enewable energy projects can take longer to permit than conventional projects. Conventional projects may have more environmental impacts, but the
nature of those impacts is better understood by agencies and there usually is a long
track record of similar projects that agency staff can use as regulatory precedents.
Renewable energy projects, on the other hand, often involve new technologies with
more uncertain or newer types of impacts, and are proposed for locations where there
is less understanding of the existing environment . . . . Agency staff also may lack
examples of earlier-approved projects, which they can use as permit templates [or]
may not have sorted out which agencies are responsible for what type of projects. All
of these factors mean that renewable energy projects perversely may take longer to
permit because they involve new technologies that do not involve undesirable, but
well-understood, negative effects. The more cutting edge a technology, and the more
unusual location where it will be located, the more challenging the project may appear to agency regulators.”).
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energy projects specifically.201
V.

PROBLEMS

WITH

WIND SEVERANCE

AND

CURRENT RESPONSES

This Section will address first, the problems created by wind severance; second, the response of legislative bans on this type of severance; and finally, the apparent negative repercussions of these bans.
A. The Problems with Wind Severance
Absent a specific ban on wind severance, there appears to be a presumption that a severable fee estate in wind might be the appropriate
common law default for its categorization. The Contra Costa case, discussed above, came to the conclusion that wind was severable because
it was a property right that could be bought and sold.202 The case
involved eminent domain proceedings in which the water district condemned ranch acreage upon which wind turbines had been erected or
were planned.203 In the condemnation proceedings, the water district,
unwilling to pay the extra costs for wind rights, stipulated that the
landowner retained its rights for wind energy and the transmission of
wind power on the acreage in question.204 The landowner argued that
the severance was invalid because there was no existing precedent for
severing the wind rights from the remainder of the land ownership.205
Not all interests in property that can be bought or sold qualify as
severable estates. For example, a lease is property capable of being
bought and sold, but leases are not generally considered severable interests.206 However, the Contra Costa court’s rationale rested on defining the wind right as being comparable to an oil and gas right.
Once the right had been defined in this way, it then followed that
wind severance was permissible because the severance of oil and gas
was permissible.207
The issue of the validity of a severance of wind rights remains unresolved in most states.208 Although no other court in the country has
similarly categorized wind rights as comparable to oil and gas rights,
201. See, e.g., Eagle Permits: Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,267 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 13 and 22)
(requiring additional compensatory mitigation over the duration of a permit to mitigate the level of authorized take below the originally authorized take levels).
202. Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Ct.
App. 1997).
203. Id. at 274.
204. Id. at 282.
205. Id. at 278.
206. A lease is more often considered a contractual right. Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776
(2001). However, the line between contract and property rights is often blurred. Id. at
777. Note that easements also do not generally qualify as estates that can be granted
in fee title. SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 4.02.
207. Contra Costa, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
208. SMITH ET AL., supra note 153, § 4.02.
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many landowners have severed those rights from the surface presumably basing this form of ownership on similar assumptions to those in
the Contra Costa case paralleling wind with oil and gas development.209 Thus, the grant of wind rights in some states such as Texas,
which is the nation’s wind leader, typically are written as if those
rights were severable.210 Without clear authority on the topic, the
question of whether or not a court will enforce these property rights
creates legal uncertainty.211 As a result, some project developers appear to have stopped working with landowners who have severed
wind rights.212 Thus, one of the problems of wind severance is the
legal title uncertainty that could potentially leave acres of valuable
wind lands undeveloped.
Wind severance also has the potential to cause significant problems
on the ground. Many of these problems are similar to those for the
extraction of minerals or other fossil fuels—problems interpreting the
implied easement of access and potential conflicts with surface owners
who do not want development. Severance exacerbates the conflicts
between surface owners and those who wish to develop resources because surface owners must suffer the intrusion on their daily lives and
livelihoods without any financial benefit. The owner of the severed
mineral or wind estate, not the surface owner, receives royalties.
Wind farms have the potential for even more acute conflicts because
of the extensive and long-term surface use required for development.213 When surface owners do not control the severed interests,
they generally have little or no say in the development of the project
and no bargaining power to seek accommodation.214
Furthermore, severance of wind can cause conflicts between competing severed interests. The potential that each of the severed estates are entitled to dominance over the surface through the concept
209. DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156, at 9-13, 9-26. See also Ernest Smith, Wind
Energy: Sitting Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J.
281, 302 (2007).
210. Smith, supra note 210, at 303–307. Severance can occur through a deed in
which the rights to the wind are either granted or reserved or through a will that
devises wind rights apart from other incidents of ownership. SMITH ET AL., supra note
153, § 4.02.
211. Smith, supra note 210, at 303. See also Michael J. Stephan, Note, Wind Severance, 40 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 73 (2009–2010); Lisa Chavarria, The Severance of Wind
Rights in Texas 1 (2008), http://sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/Chavarria-The_Sever
ance_of_Wind_Rights%20(Final).pdf.
212. DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156, at 9-21 n.131 (quoting Mark Safty of Holland & Hart). See also Blaire D. Parker, Capturing the Wind: the Challenges of a New
Energy Source in Texas, H. RESEARCH ORG. TEX. H.R., FOCUS REP. NO. 80-9 (2008).
“Attorneys advise their clients against severance of wind rights from surface rights,
and any statute regulating this may have unintended consequences for existing leases,
previous severance is, and future wind energy development in the state.” Id. at 18.
213. DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156, at 9-9, 9-11.
214. Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind
Law, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 179–182 (2010).
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of the implied access of the easement could create confusion about the
order of development of multiple resources.215 These sets of complications could hurt not just wind energy development but also mineral
development.216
As a result, some commentators, including the Author here, have
argued in the past for a ban on wind severance to simplify the situation and to protect all parties’ interests.217 The rationale was to keep
the surface owners involved in receiving royalties and allowing them
to act as mediators between mineral and wind right developers.218 In
addition, the non-severance solution also appeared to offer an opportunity “to encourage the best development of our country’s wind
resources.”219
B. Legislation Banning Wind Severance
Without waiting for courts to thrash out the status of wind rights,
several state legislatures have jumped in to ban wind severance.
In 1996, South Dakota became the first state to enact such a ban.220
At the same time that the Contra Costa case was working its way
through the courts in California, the South Dakota legislature passed
a law banning the severance of the wind right from the surface
estate.221
South Dakota’s ban on severance, section 43-13-19, does allow for a
lease of the right to produce wind power.222 However, the lease is
limited to a period of fifty years. In addition, if no wind power production occurs on the land within five years after the beginning of the
lease, the lease is also void.223 South Dakota’s statute has become
something of a model for similar legislation banning severance, and
the preference for lease rights over severance appears to have become
the norm in severance-banning statutes.224
215. Id. at 9-13.
216. Smith & Diffen, supra note 214.
217. DuVivier, supra note 2, at 98. See also Alexander, supra note 97, at 455–56.
218. DuVivier, supra note 2, at 97.
219. Id.
220. South Dakota banned severance to protect landowners from speculators who
were buying up wind rights at $1 per acre before farmers or ranchers recognized their
potential value. Telephone interview with Steve Wigman, analyst for the Public Utilities Commission, who claims to have written the legislation for South Dakota legislator Paul Simons (Sept. 2, 2008).
221. 1996 S.D. Laws ch. 260 (S.B. 95).
222. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-13-19 (2013) (“No interest in any resource located
on a tract of land and associated with the production or potential production of energy from wind power on the tract of land may be severed from the surface estate . . .
except that such rights may be leased for a period not to exceed fifty years. Any such
lease is void if no development of the potential to produce energy from wind power
has occurred on the land within five years after the lease began.”).
223. Id.
224. South Dakota has also created a provision allowing for wind easements. S.D.
Codified Laws § 43-13-17 (2013). “Any property owner may grant a wind easement in
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Nearly ten years passed before another state followed South Dakota’s lead to ban wind severance. In 2005, North Dakota enacted
section 17-04-04 which banned severance of the wind right from the
surface estate.225 As with South Dakota, North Dakota limited the
time available on wind easements and leases, as well as including the
requirement that development occur within five years.226
Little else happened with severance legislation for a few years, but a
chorus of commentators weighed in during this period.227 This new
awareness raised by commentators, and some litigation about wind
severance,228 seems to have spurred the next wave of legislation.
In 2010, a Colorado legislator proposed a bill that would have allowed landowners to sever wind rights from the surface estate.229 This
bill did not make it out of committee. However, just two years later,
Colorado shifted in the other direction and passed a non-severance
the same manner and with the same effect as a conveyance of an interest in real
property. . . . Any such easement runs with the land or lands benefited or burdened
and terminates upon the conditions stated in the easement, except that the term of
any such easement may not exceed fifty years. Any such easement is void if no development of the potential to produce energy from wind power associated with the easement has occurred within five years after the effective date of the easement.” The
“runs with the land” language re-enforces that severance does not extend to these
easements.
225. 2005 N.D. Laws 1573; N.D. Cent. Code § 17-04-04 (2013) (“Except for a wind
easement created under § 17-04-03 and as otherwise provided in this section, an interest in a resource located on a tract of land and associated with the production of
energy for wind power on the tract of land may not be severed from the surface
estate. However, nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit or limit the right
of a seller to retain any payments associated with an existing wind energy project.”).
226. The North Dakota statute included a provision that the ban only applied prospectively. Several of the subsequent statutes also included a similar quote grandfather “provision to avoid potential” takings. North Dakota did include a provision that
this ban only applied proactively. This began a potentially unfortunate trend in enacting these statutes—any wind estates that were severed before 2005 (or the passing of
the relevant statute in other states) remained severed afterward. While no cases have
come forth about issues created from this, it does seem to legitimize the hesitation of
developers in recognizing severed wind estates.
227. E.g., DuVivier, supra note 2, at 89 (“The lessons learned from oil development
demonstrate that [the law of ownership rights to oil] should serve as a cautionary tale
rather than as a model for efficient and equitable wind production.”). See also
DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156; Kathleen D. Kapla & Craig Trummel, Severing
Wind Rights Raises Legal Issues, N. AM. WIND POWER (Oct. 2010), http://kaplalaw
.com/NAW1010_WindRightsArticle.pdf; Nathaniel C. Giddings & Laurie A. Ristino,
Proposal: A Uniform Act for Wind Rights, ENERGY COMMS. NEWSLETTER 8:2, 1 (Mar.
1, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/en
ergy/201103_energy.authcheckdam.pdf; Roderick E. Wetsel & H. Alan Carmichael,
Currrent Issues In Texas Wind Energy Law, STATE BAR OF TEX. AGRIC. LAW (2009);
Lisa Chavarria, Wind Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. B.J. 832 (2005); Smith, supra
note 210; Stephan, supra note 210; Chavarria, supra note 212.
228. Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D.N.M. 2009); Zimmerman v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Wabanasee Cnty., 264 P.3d 989 (Kan. 2011) (This case was first
filed in 2005.).
229. RUSS, supra note 149, at 5-6; H.R. DOC. NO. 10-1158, 67th Gen. Assem. 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010).
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statute in 2012.230 This Colorado statute was similar to the South Dakota statute but also explicitly stated that the wind energy was an interest in real property that belonged to the surface estate owner.231
In 2011, Montana, Wyoming, and Kansas all passed non-severance
statutes.232 All three of these looked very similar to South Dakota
and North Dakota’s statutes. Nebraska, which had already used legislation to declare wind a property right in 2009,233 also passed a nonseverance statute in 2012.234 Nebraska’s statute is unique in that it not
only bans wind severance but also severance of solar energy rights.235
C. Repercussions of Severance Bans
The Author of this Article was one of the first to write about the
problems of wind severance236 and to encourage a statutory ban on
the practice.237 However, it appears success in passing these statutory
bans, while solving some problems, may have created unintended negative consequences.
Some are making the assumption that non-severed wind rights
should revert to the status of the surface estate and therefore be automatically subservient to severed oil and gas or other minerals.238 A
report to the Wyoming legislature went further to encourage express
language in the wind severance ban statute to establish mineral estate
dominance:
230. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.7-103 (2013).
231. Id. § 38-30.7-101.
232. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70-17-404(1) (2013); 2011 Mont. Laws 977; WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 34-27-103(b) (West 2013); 2011 Wyo. Sess. Laws 17; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 582272(b) (West 2011); 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws 692.
233. 2009 Neb. Laws 997.
234. 2012 Neb. Laws 497.
235. NEB. REV. STAT § 76-3004 (2013) (“No interest in any wind or solar resource
located on a tract of land and associated with the production or potential production
of wind or solar energy on the tract of land may be severed from the surface estate.”).
236. DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156; DuVivier, supra note 2, at 71.
237. The Author testified about wind energy and severance before the Colorado
House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, and Natural Resources on Jan. 30, 2012.
The Committee was considering HB 12-1105, legislation that addressed Wind Energy
Property Rights. After Professor DuVivier’s testimony, the Committee voted unanimously in favor of the bill. The Author testified in favor of the non-severance bill that
passed before a committee of the Colorado General Assembly. See also Peter Blake,
Lawmakers seek to harness the wind—legally speaking—and tie it to the land, COLO.
NEWS AGENCY COVERING THE CAPITOL (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.coloradonews
agency.com/2012/02/02/lawmakers-seek-to-harness-the-wind%E2%80%94legallyspeaking%E2%80%94and-tie-it-to-the-land/; Interview by Ryan Warner with Professor K.K. DuVivier, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law (Feb. 2, 2012).
238. See, e.g., John Hickenlooper, Colo. Governor, Debate at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law: Who Should Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing in Colorado? (Apr. 1, 2013), http://mediaserv.law.du.edu/flashvideo/specialevents/HydraulicFracturing-in-Colo-Debate/Hydraulic-Fracturing-in-Colorado-Debate-4-1-13.htm
(stating that oil and gas rights had priority because they were severed estates and that
renewable resources did not have similar development rights because of their nonseverable status).
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Similar to pore space legislation, a legislative declaration of the estate dominance could reduce future litigation and create some certainty for wind developers. A declaration of mineral estate
dominance would establish a baseline hierarchy of estates while
shifting the burden on wind developers to conduct prudent operations in order to avoid conflicts. Additionally, a declaration of who
is vested with the rights of ownership to wind would further reduce
future conflicts.239

Yet, none of the rationales used by the judges who were responsible
for the creation of mineral severance or the dominant-servient estate
doctrine throughout the evolution of those concepts support subjugating wind to fossil fuels.
As noted above, the primary rationale for allowing “bounding” or
mineral severance was the benefit to the public of allowing development of a valuable common resource.240 This rationale applies
equally for wind energy development as it does for other mineral or
fossil fuel rights. In fact, in the context of climate change, an argument could be made that development of renewable energy resources
should be a higher public priority than fossil fuel development.
Early cases only justified severance’s “interference with the common law rights of property” because the surface owner was to receive
some compensation (in “toll tin”).241 While current-day severance
frequently takes the surface owner out of the equation for consultation and royalties, nonsevered wind rights allow the best result—development of a public resource without abrogation of the common law
and with the involvement of, and rewards for, the surface owner.
Second, the rationale judges have used for developing the dominant-servient estate doctrine also supports an enhanced status for
wind. The role of wind power in addressing U.S. energy needs attests
to its “quasi public character . . . absolutely essential to our common
comfort and prosperity.”242 To place wind development beyond the
reach of the public would be “a great public wrong.”243
239. Benjamin A. Kinney & Brian J. Marvel, Defining Wind Rights in Wyoming: A
Practical Solution, in Memo from Mary Byrnes, Associate Director of Energy Outreach, University of Wyoming—School of Energy Resources to Senator Jim Anderson, Chairman of the Task Force on Wind Energy of the Wyoming Legislature,
Submission of University of Wyoming- College of Law, Wind Energy Legal Research
Reports, at 30 (Oct. 11, 2009), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/WindEnergy/44
.pdf. In the subsequent Wyoming statute, the legislature adopted the memo’s adoption by stating that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to change the common law
as of Apr. 1, 2011 as it relates to the rights belonging to, or the dominance of, the
mineral estate.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-27-104 (2014).
240. See supra text accompanying note 26.
241. See supra text accompanying note 26.
242. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1983); see also supra
text accompanying note 35.
243. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599; see also supra text accompanying note 48.
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Furthermore, some of the statutes that banned wind severance,
nonetheless, recognized “a nonseverable wind energy right in real
property.”244 This property right, whether held by the surface owner
or a wind developer, also requires access for development or the right
“would be wholly worthless. . . .”245 Therefore, there is a business, as
well as a legal, basis for distinguishing wind development rights from
traditional servient surface rights.
In addition, there are policy arguments against giving conventional
severed rights legal dominance over wind rights. In the absence of
clear authority on the dominance of one estate over another, oil and
gas operators have been urged to work with wind operators to negotiate accommodation or surface use agreements.246 Even in this climate
of uncertainty, traditional oil and mineral estate owners have been
less willing to work with other interests based simply upon the assumption that their rights have a higher priority. If this hierarchy is
formalized and traditional interests are given uncontested dominance,
the incentives to negotiate are further decreased, exacerbating the situation to the detriment of wind development.
Some might argue that oil and gas is more valuable, therefore justifying its dominant status over wind.247 However, as the Chartiers
Block Coal court noted, the relative value of various estates may shift
over time.248 Instead of legally entrenching fossil fuels as dominant,
and therefore the winners with renewable resources as the losers, a
more logical approach would be to allow both the wind and the fossil
fuel estates equal dignity under the law and to let the market decide
how the parties choose to work things out.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the sins of severance from oil and gas were a basis for urging
legislators not to create similar landowner-developer relationships in
the context of wind, it is problematic if these sins are the cause for
additional impediments to wind development. This conclusion however, is not a necessary result. The same rationales for development
of oil and gas apply to wind, so they should be used not only to encourage its development but also to make it an estate of equal dignity
to fossil fuels regardless of its severance status.
244. See, e.g., Colo. H.B. 12-1105, available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/
CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/DD27838CF592266487257981007F166B?Open&file=
1105_enr.pdf.
245. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943); see also supra text accompanying note 49.
246. See, e.g., DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 156, at 9-22 to 9-23.
247. Currently, royalty returns for landowners for oil and gas wells is generally exponentially higher than for wind energy royalties. See, e.g., DuVivier & Wetsel, supra
note 156, at 9-29 n.166.
248. Chartiers Block Coal, 25 A. at 599; see also supra text accompanying note 34.
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Courts created the law of severance and the dominant–servient estate doctrine in the context of the needs of their times. Our times
require new, as well as old, forms of energy. Fossil fuels have been
rewarded for their sins with enhanced legal status. Instead of imposing penance for these past sins on the next generation of renewable
energy resources, the goal should be a system that equally encourages
the development of all forms of energy consistent with the values of
our Environmental Era.
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